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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MOSE ALIX, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9167

vs.
LEON BROWN,
Intervening Plaintiff and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF INTERVENING PLAINTIFF AND
RESPONDENT, LEON BROWN
INTRODUCTION
Appellant's Statement of facts includes as
"facts" too many statements, to qudte the expression of the appellant's attorney, "dehors the record",
to be acceptable to the respondent. For example it
is stated at page 2 of the appellant's brief :-"Plain'tiff Pender's title is deraigned from Arnold E. Wall,
the heir or beneficiary of Nellie Wall, who was the
owner of said property ( Rec. 35) ". Rec. 35 is a
1
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photostatic copy of a quit claim deed from one
Arnold E. Wall to the appellant. This document
does not in any way substantiate the statement
that Nellie WaU was the owner of the property nor can any substantiation of this rather crucial
point be found anywhere else in 'the entire record.
In view of this and other innaccuracies in the Statement of Facts of the Appellant, Respondent chooses
to make his own statement of facts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent herein, Leon Brown, for a consideration of $200.00, acquired by Deed of Salt Lake
County the title of said County to the following described real estate located within said County:Commencing 612¥2 feet South and 66
feet West from the Northwest Corner of
Block 4, Plat "C", Salt Lake County Survey,
running thence North 300 feet, thence West
2'96 feet, thence South 328 feet 'to river, Easterly along river to beginning. (R. 28).
The County deed was dated September 16th,
1942, and was duly recorded in the office of the
Recorder of Salt Lake County on September 18,
1942 in Book 261 at Page 637. (R. 10, 28) Respondent entered into possession of the ground described
in the deed and made use of said ground in the conduct of the floral business owned and operated by
him. ( R. 10) The use consisted of plowing the land,
clearing weeds from it, planting crops on it, and use
2
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as a growing yard and storage yard. ( R. 10) Respondent paid all taxes lawfully levied and assessed
against the said land from the da:te of acquisition
by him from the County to the date of the filing
of the complaint in intervention in the case now
before this court. (R. 10, 12-27 inc.)
On May 19, 1948, a Notice of Lis Pendens -v1as
filed by appellant through his attorney, Milton V.
Backman, with the Recorder of Salt Lake County,
which notice was entered in Book 610 at Page 205
of the records of that office. ( R. 80) This notice
contained a statement that Rennold Pender had filed
a complaint in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, praying for judgment in favor of the p laintiff and against the defendants quieting title to the
property described in the notice, which along with
numerous other tracts of land contained a description of the tract in question in the instant action.
( R. 80) Leon Brown, though his interest in the
land in question was of record, as above set forth,
was never joined as a party to the action commenced
by Pender. (R. 1 Par. 3., R. 3 Par. 4., R. 6 & 7
second defense & appellant's brief P. 2 & 6.) To rid
his title of the cloud of the recorded Lis Pendens and
of any claim by the appellant or other parties to the
action, Respondent, on the 9th day of July 19'59
moved the court for permission under the Rules of
1

3
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Civil Procedure to intervene in the action commenced by appellant. (R. 1, 2) The intervention was
granted by the court and an order entered July
17th, 1959 authorizing Respondent to file a complaint in intervention and directing appellant to
answer the same within 20 days from service of the
order and the con1plaint. (R. 5) The order was
served the day it vvas entered, on counsel for the
appellant. (R. 5) Appellant filed an answer to the
complaint in intervention on July 31, 1959 denying
respondents allegations of 'title but not affirmatively
pleading any title in the appellant. (R. 6) A motion
for judgment on the pleadings and for summary
judgment was fi'led by Respondent supported by
affidavit and exhibits consisting of photostatic copies
of the deed from Salt Lake County to the Respondent and of the receipted tax notices from 1943
through 1958. ( R. 8-28 inc.) The matter was called
up for hearing on respondent's motion, and at the
hearing thereon appellant appeared by his counsel
Milton V. Backman and requested leave to file an
amended answer. This request was resisted by respondent, but the Court overruled respondent's objection, denied the motion for summary judgment
and permitted the amended answer to be filed.
(R. 7) Thereupon, Respondent filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. (R. 29, 30) Appellant filed a doc-
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ument entitled "Plaintiff's Supporting Documents
Filed in Connection With Second Motion of Intervening Plaintiff for Summary Judgment". (R. 31)
This document listed several attachments which were
filed with the document including a photostatic copy
of an unrecorded quit claim deed from one Arnold.
E. Wall to appellant and describing the property
of interest herein, as well as other property. The
deed from Wall bore the date of August 2'9th, 1951,
which is substantia!lly after the date of the filing
of the Lis Pendens by the Appellant. (R. 35, 80)
No evidence was ever produced nor is there any
portion of the record which in any way connects
this isolated deed with the chain of legal or fee
title to the property. The motion for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings was duly and
regularly called up for hearing before the court
by the respondent. At the hearing no testimony was
taken nor other evidence introduced. On this state
of the record, after having heard the arguments of
counsel the court took the matter under advisement and subsequently caused a minute entry to
be made of its order granting the summary judgment as prayed. (R. 65) A written Judgment and
Decree were duly presented to the Court and signed
October 9th, 1959 by the Honorab1e Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge. (R. 66-68). A copy of the Judgment and
Decree was duly served upon Counsel for Appel5
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lant, but no objections were ever filed to any of
the Findings contained therein nor to the Judgment
and Decree itself. Within the time allowed by law,
Rennold Pender, appellant, filed a Notice of Appeal
to -this Court. (R. 69) While there are numerous
other parties named defendants to the original action commenced by appellant in which respondent
was permitted to intervene, no party other than
appelaant Pender and respondent Brown in any manner appeared or participated in the proceedings in
the court below from which this appeal 1s prosecuted.
POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S RIGHT IN THE LAND IN QUESTION BASED UPON POSSESSION UNDER TAX DEED
FROM SALT LAKE COUNTY AND PAYMENT OF ALL
TAXES LAWFULLY ASSESSED THEREON FOR A
PERIOD OF MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS PRIOR
TO FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION BY RESPONDENT IS A SUFFICIENT TITLE
TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT QUIETING TITLE IN RESPONDENT.
POINT II
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO RIGHT TITLE OR
INTEREST IN OR TO THE LAND IN QUESTION AND
CANNOT BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT QUIETING TITLE
IN THE RESPONDENT.
POINT III
ANY CLAIM OF APPELLANT IS BARRED BY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
6
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ARGUMENT
No a'ttem pt is here made by Respondent to
answer the argument of Appellant under the same
points as those set forth in appellants brief because
the points there enumerated are, in the opinion of
respondent, entirely incidental to the main issue
before the court, and will be disposed of by the argument here presented on the basic issues which
respondent believes the court must decide.
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S RIGHT IN THE LAND IN QUESTION BASED UPON POSSESSION UNDER TAX DEED
FROM SALT LAKE COUNTY AND PAYMENT OF ALL
TAXES LAWFULLY ASSESSED THEREON FOR A
PERIOD OF lVIORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS PRIOR
TO FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION BY RESPONDENT IS A SUFFICIENT TITLE
TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT QUIETING TITLE IN RESPONDENT.

Respondent, Leon Brown, pleaded in his complaint in intervention that he was the owner of
the tract of land therein described having acquired
title to it from Salt Lake County by deed of said
County duly recorded, and that he had owned, occupied and possessed said property under claim of
right and paid all taxes lawfully assessed thereon.
( R. 3, 4) Appellant by his Answer and likewise by
his amended answer to the complaint in intervention denied this allegation of the respondent, but
did not affiratively plead either that the 'title thus
7
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claimed by respondent was defective nor did appellant plead any title in himself (R. 6, 7) In the
amended answer which appellant was permitted to
file, appellant pleaded tha:t the complaint in intervention was barred by the provisions of Sections
104-2-5 and 104-2-5, 11 UCA 1943. (R. 7) No
reliance on this defense was had at the hearing before the court, and the ma:tter is not presented nor
argued by appellant before this court and consequently it is assumed that the defense thus pleaded
was abandoned.
Respondent filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment under the applicable ru[es of civil procedure and supported the motion with the affidavit of respondent and a photosta:tic copy of the deed from Salt Lake County
bearing the recording data, and copies of each of
the annual general property tax notices bearing
the payment received stamp and validation number
of the County Treasurer for the years from 1943
to and including 1958, the last year for which taxes
had become payable prior to the filing of the cornplaint in intervention. ( R. 8-30) The affidavit of
the respondent alleged the acquisition by respondent
of the title and interest of Salt Lake County by
deed and the continuous possession of the property
by respondent and use thereof in the floral business
owned by respondent consisting of plowing of said
8
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land, clearing the weeds therefrom, planting of
crops therein, use of lands for growing yards and
storage yards continuously and successively from
the acquisition of said lands to the commencement
of the action in intervention, and the payment of
all taxes levied and assessed upon the premises.
( R. 10) No counter affidavit was ever filed by
appellant. Appellant filed a document entitled,
"Plaintiff's Supporting Documents Filed In Connection With Second Motion of Intervening Plaintiff For Summary Judgment." (R. 31) To this
were appended copies of the following documents
which were listed therein, Affidavit of lVIrs. Robert
Ford dated October 5th, 1959; Affidavit of Walter
E. Porschatis, dated October 3rd, 1959; quit claim
deed of Arnold E. Wall to Rennold Pender, dated
August 29, 1951; Protest of L. H. Gray dated May
20, 1936, recorded Book 167, Page 80 Salt Lake
County Recorder's Records, and a Natice of Lis
Pendens filed by Rennold Pender at 'the time of
commencement of the action in which this intervention was ultimately filed. (R. 31, 35, 78-80) Appellant offered no testimony or other evidence a't
any time. It is apparent from the argument that
appelQant considered that in some manner an issue
of fact was presented by the filing of the documents
referred to, which could not be resolved except by
Trial and which was pertinent to the issues before
9
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the court. Appellant argues therefore that the summary judgment should not have been granted. It
is submitted that an examination of all of the material submitted by the appellant does not raise any
issue or dispute of fact which is even material to
the matter which was before the court, to wit, the
valid!ty of the tax title claimed by the respondent,
and the status which he claimed to enjoy thereunder
as the possessor paying taxes for more than fifteen
years. It is noted that there is not one arlegation of
possession in the appellant, nor contravention of
any of the facts upon which the respondent based his
title.
It is noted that at page 5 of appellants brief
the attempt is made to assail the validity of the
County deed. The argument there presented is so
fallacious as to hardly merit the dignity of a reply.
There is not one scintilla of law that says that the
purchaser of a tax title is subject to the maxim
- "let the Buyer beware", and no such law is cited
by the appellant. Appellant attempts to rely upon
the affidavit of L. H. Gray as giving notice to all
the world and respondent in particular of a defect
in the tax title. The quotation therefrom in appellant's brief is entirely misleading. A reading of
the document reflects that far from setting forth
any irregularity in connection with the imposition
or collection of the taxes protested therein, Mr. Gray
10
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bases his protest entirely on the fact that the owner,
whom he purports to represent, did not have the
money to pay the taxes, and due to the depression
was unable to borrow any money with which to
pay the taxes, and that therefore any attempt to
collect the taxes was an unconstitutional delegation
of powers and illegal. ( R. 78, 79) Far from being
notice of any imperfection in the tax title or the
procedures in levying the taxes the document speaks
in clear terms of the fact that the taxes were due
and payable and the owner could not pay them.
By a statement, which appellants brief at Page 5
admits is entirely "dehors the record", appellant
seeks to bring before this court a technical defect
in the procedure which appeillant claims occured,
in that the auditors affidavit was not attached for
the years involved in the sale. Counsel attempts to
lay claim that the affidavit of Gray is bottomed on
this defect. A reading of the affidavit conclusively
disproves this al1legation. Appellant offered no proof
of any such defect or of any other defect in the
title passed by the deed of Salt Lake County. It
was the burden of the appellant to plead and to
prove such defects if any were claimed and there
was no atter.apt made by appellant to do so. Tha;t it
is the burden of the party asserting a defect in 'the
title of one claiming under a Tax Deed from the
County, to plead and prove the defect is well establl
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lished. Title 80-10-68 UCA 1943 was enacted into
law as chapter 101 Laws of Utah 1939. This section states,
"* * * ( 5) The county auditor is authorized in the name of 'the county to execute deeds
conveying in fee simple all property sold at
said public sale to the purchaser and to attest the same with his seal. Deeds issued by
the county auditor in pursuance of this section or of section 80-10-66 shall recite the
total amount of all the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs which were paid in
for the execution and delivery of the deed, the
year for which the property was assessed and
sold to the county at preliminary sale, a full
description of the property and the name of
the grantee, and when executed and delivered
by the auditor shall be prima facie evidence
of all proceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale and of conveyance of the property
to the grantee in fee simple. * * * (8) All
property for which there is no purchaser
at the sale heretofore provided for in this
section may be disposed of at either public
or private sale for such price and upon such
terms as the said board may determine; * * *
The county clerk is authorized to execute
deeds for all property sold pursuant to this
subsection in the name of the county and attest the same by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of the title of all taxing unit or
districts in the real estate sold."
Examination of the deed given in this instance
to respondent discloses that it complies with the
statute as to form and recitals and is executed as
required by law. (R. 28)
12
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This Court has recognized the effect of the
1939 amendment to the code and its effect in making the tax deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale in the case of Anson v. EUison, 104 Utah
576, 140 P2d 653 at page 655 where it is said:
"* * * the 1939 amendment to 80-10-68
(L '39, Ch 101) which amendment authorized the issuance of a new form of tax deed
and made this new tax deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale. * * *"
Even prior to this amendment to the law, when
there was no s'tatuory authority for the effect of
the deed and the claimant under the deed was required to prove the regularity of the proceedings
leading up to the deed in order to give it effect, this
court recognized that the deed by itself was sufficient title to vrithstand the onslaught of a mere
intruder who did not in any manner connect himself with 'the chain of title or show himself in any
way to be the fee owner or claiming through him.
In the case of Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34
P2d 697 this court said:
"It is earnestJly urged on behalf of defendant that plaintiff failed to establish any
title to the property in question. Such contention is founded upon the fact as shown by the
evidence 'that Plaintiff's grantor acquired his
title by a tax deed from Sevier county. It is
apparently defendant's position that he may
13
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not be deprived of his possession of the disputed strip of land and of his claim of title
except by one who establishes a superior title
'thereto, and that plaintiff failed to establish
any title. Our attention is directed to the following cases (citing cases) . The cases cited
are authority for the doctrine that one whose
'ti'~le is founded upon a tax deed must prove
a strict compliance with the various provisions of the Statute regulating the levy of
taxes and the sale of the property upon which
the tax has become delinquent ·when such tax
title is asserted against the original owner or
one claiming under him. A different rule is aplied when a tax deed is asserted against a
mere intruder. In such case it has been held
that a purchaser at a tax sale has all that is
required against one who enters without right.
Black on Tax Titles Sec. 445, P. 564, 61 C. J.
1396, and cases cited in the footnotes. It is
not necessary, however, to determine whether
'the defendant's claim to the land in question
was such as to entitle him to attack such deed
issued to p!laintiff's grantor, because defendant did not attempt to attack such deed.
While in his answer, defendant denied generally plaintiff's ownership of the land described in the complaint, it is apparent from
the pleadings and the evidence that the sole
issue tried out was whether or not defendant
had acquired title to the strip of land within
his inclosure by reason of his claim of a long
established boundary line. The only evidence
offered concerning the tax deed was the mere
fact that such a deed had been given to plaintiff's grantor. Defendant, through his counsel,
stipu1lated that such a deed had been given.
The record is silent as to the owner of the
1 ,j
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land before it was sold for taxes. * * * In the
absence of some evidence tending to show the
invalidity of the tax deed issued by Sevier
County to plaintiff's grantor, it may not be
said that plaintiff failed to make out a prima
facie title to the land claimed by him."
The parallel between the cited case and the
case before the court is interesting because likewise
in this case there is no issue raised about the Tax
deed and there is no evidence in the record whatever as to the owner prior to the sale· for taxes. We
submit that either according to the benefit of the
statutory effect given to the Tax deed at the time of
its issuance, or under the state of the law as recognized by the court in the above citation prior to the
amendment of the statute in 1939, the action of
the court below in recognizing respondents tax deed
as sufficient was correct.
Appelllant further argues a't some length in his
brief that the affidavits of Porschalis and of Ford
show a lack of possession in respondent and raise
an issue on this point. It was admitted by both
parties 'that the land is a vacant lot, that no structure has been raised thereon. Respondent claimed
to have used the ground in his floral business, cleared
the weeds and to have plowed the same and grown
crops thereon. ( R. 10) Far from disproving the
allegations of the respondent the affidavits of both
Porschatis and of Ford substantiate the claim of
15
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the respondent. Porschatis says, "The only time I
have seen any occupancy on this property was approximately from two to three and a half years
ago when a portion of this property was for one
season used for growing gladiolus." (R. 34) Mrs.
Ford says, "In one year soon after 1946 someone
attempted to raise some vegetables on a portion of
the property and the vegetaHles turned out to be
a failure, full of worms. About 1956 someone tried
to raise some flowers for one season on a portion
of the property and it vvas a failure." (R. 32) Certainly these statements are consistent ·with the statements of the respondent, and it must be noted that
there is no evidence of any intervening use inconsistent with the use of the respondent which in any
way dispossessed him. The allegation that is made
in Mrs. Ford's affidavit tha:t the city dredged the
river and put the leavings on the bank of the river
along the land in question does not indicate any
dispossession of the respondent in the absence of a
showing that ft was done without his permission
and without right by the city. No showing of this
nature is made. Under this state of the record respondent asserts that no substantial issue of fact
on possession was before the court, and 'the record
substantiates the action of the Court in granting
the summary judgment quieting title in the respondent to the land in question.
16
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POINT II
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO RIGHT TITLE OR
INTEREST IN OR TO THE LAND IN QUESTION AND
CANNOT BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT QUIETING TITLE
IN THE RESPONDENT.

Appellant did not plead tiBle 'to the land in
question was in himself, nor did he offer any credible proof that tide to the land in question was in
him, ( R. 6. r1) nor did he submit any proof that he
was ever at any time in possession of the land in
question or had paid any taxes thereon. Appellant's
sole effort at shovving any interest in the land in
question to be in himself consisted of the filing as a
part of the document filed in the lower court in response 'to respondent's motion for judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment, two documents,
the first a Lis Pendens in which it is stated that,
"* * * Rennold Pender has filed his complaint in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, praying for judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against defendants, quieting
tit'le in plaintiff in and to the following described properties situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, * * *''
The Lis Pendens then described many tracts of
property one of which was the tract in vo1ved herein.
( R. 80) . This Notice of Lis Pendens was filed with
the recorder of Salt Lake County May 19th, 1948
and duly entered in the records of that office. (R. 80)
The Tax Deed to Leon Brown was recorded September 18, 1942. (R. 28) It is admitted that
17
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Leon Bro·'iJvn ~ras not made a party defendant
to the action commenced by appellant. (Appellant's
brief P. 2 & 6 & R. 1 Par. 3, 3 Par. 4) The only
other evidence in any way attempting to show ti~le
in appellant consisted of a photostatic copy of a
quit claim deed from one Arnold E. Wall to the·
appellant. (R. 35). This deed bears date of August 29'th, 1'951, and had not been recorded. It is
observed that 'the deed is dated substantially after
the filing of the Lis Pendens referred to above.
These two documents stand entirely isolated. No:
effort was made by appellant to introduce any evidence of the connection of the deed of Arnold E. vVall
with the chain of title. The appellant in his brief
states that Nellie Wall was the owner of the property. Not one scintilla of evidence of this fact was
ever offered, nor can any such be found in the
record. The deed of Arnold E. Wall, who claims
to be a beneficiary under the Last Will and Testament of Nellie M. Wall deceased, in the absence of
a showing of some title in the grantor, is meaningless. The deed is not a warranty deed. A quit claim.
deed under the existing law conveys only the inter-·
est of the grantor at the time that the deed was·
given. Appellant 'totally failed to show any interest
of the gran tor in the land in question. Likewise the
appellant never at any time pleaded nor proved that
he had at any time been in possession of the pro18
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perty or paid any taxes. The presumption indulged
in under the 1aws of this state of possession of the
legal owner is of no avail to appellant in the absence of a showing or a pleading that he was the
legal owner.
Interestingly enough this court in a previous
decision rendered in regard to other property involved in this same suit commenced by Pender has
told this same appellant that the mere presentation
of an isolated deed to property the validity of which
was ndt proved gave the a ppe1lant no standing to
assail the title of the tax title holder. We refer to
the case of Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 P2d
1057. In that case Pender presented a deed from
one Hansen who did appear in the chain of title
which in that case (contrary to the procedure in the
instant case) was introduced in evidence. But it
appeared that Hansen told Pender when he gave
the deed that the appearance of his name in the
chain of title was solely by reason of his receiving
title as security for a debt, that the debt had been
paid and tha:t he made no claim to the property.
Pender nevertheless took a quit claim deed from
Hansen. This court said,
"Respondents ( R. L. and Mae Bird in
that case) as herein above noted had possession of the property at the time of commencement of the action. Even assuming that the
tax 'title from the County was defective it gave
19
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the defendants, R. L. Bird and Mae Bird,
color of title which was clea1~ly superior to
the claims of record title asserted by plaintiff
which was shown to be invalid. Thus, there
was before the court a plaintiff with no vestige of title and defendants with color of title
who were in possession . . . Certainly defendants' title, however, defective it may be, is
nevertheless ample to withstand the assault
of the plaintiff so long as the plaintiff shows
no right, title or interest whatever in the
property . . .''
In order to have the standing to attack the action of the court in quieting title in the respondent
appellant must show title in himself. He cannot
prevail in an action of this kind by pointing out a
weakness, reaJl or supposed in the title of the respondent.
This rule has been so generally recognized as
to be almost platitudinous.
"As frequently stated, the complainants
right to relief depends upon the strength of
his own ti'tle, not upon the weakness of the
title of his opponent. Having failed to establish title in himself, he cannot complain of
insufficiency of the evidence upon which
the court adjudged title to be in the defendant." 44 Am. Jur. Quieting Title P. 69,
Sec. 83.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
said:
"The rule in ejectment is that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own
title and not on the weakness of the title of
20
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his adversary. A like rule obtains in an equitable action to remove a cloud from a title,
and title in the complainant is of 'the essence
of the right to relief." -Dick v. Roraker, 155
lJS 404, 39 L. Ed. 201.
This Court said in Campbell v. Union Savings
and Investment Co., 63 Utah 366; 226 Pacific 190:
"If, therefore, the defendant has shown
no right to or interest in the premises, which
it has not, how can it be heard to complain
that the court erred in adjudging plaintiff to
be the owner as against the defendant? Certainly plaintiff's title however defective it
may be, is nevertheless amp~e 'to withstand
the assaults of the defendant so long as the
defendant has shown no right, title or interest whatever in the property."
This view has been re-iterated by the Court in
the case of Pender vs. Bird, supra and in the case
of Pleasant Grove City vs. Crease, et al. 1 Utah 2d
352, 266 P2d 1019.
POINT III
ANY CLAIM OF APPELLANT IS BARRED BY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Under the circumstances and the proof presented in this case it appears unnecessary to argue
at length the position of the respondent with respect
to the protection afforded his tax title by the Statute of Limitations, 78-12-5.1-.2-.3 and 78-12-7.1
DCA 1953 as amended.l. By failing to prove his
connection with the chain of fee or legal title to
the property the appellant places himself in the
1. See Appendix for text of sections referred to.
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position of being unable to claim the benefit of any
presumption of possession in favor of the legal owner granted by law. But, in this case, even assuming
the presumption to be indulged, the affidavit of
Leon Brown which, as previously argued is not controverted, is sufficient to rebut any presumtion of
possession in the appellant. Furthermore the respondent is entitled to the benefit of the statute of
limitations. The appellant seeks to avoid the sta'tute
by claiming that the mere commencement of the
action by appellant in 1'948, though the respondent
was never joined as a party thereto tolled the Statute as to appellant. Such is not 'the law. In the
case of Wood v. Dill, 3 Kan. App. 484, 43 P. 822,
an action was commenced to foreclose a mortgage.
There appeared as of record a mortgage to another
party at the 'time that the action of foreclosure was
commenced against the mortgagor and owner. The
second mortgagee was not joined as a party to the
action and the contention was made that despite the
fact that the second mortgage was never joined as a
party to the action, that the commencement of the
action prevented 'the running of the Statute of Limitations in his favor. The court said at page 823 of
the opinion :
"It is true that
ment of the action)
assigned to Frank
Farmers' Loan and

at said date (commencesaid mortgage had been
Wood, trustee, and the
Trust Company of Kan-
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sas had no interest therein. It is also true
that the assignment to Frank Wood, trustee,
was not recorded, but it plainly appeared of
record that there was an incumbrance upon
the premises ; and it cannot be doubted that
if Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. had been a
party to such action, and properly served, not
only their rights could have been adjudicated
bu't a judgment in such action wou!ld have been
binding upon their assignee, whose assignment was not of record. I't cannot be successfully contended that, by bringing the owner
of the property affected into court, the statute of lilnitation would cease to run as 'to
the mortgagee. Their interests were neither
common nor identical. * * * As to each defendant in an action, the action is commenced
and is pending only from the time of service
of the summons on hin1 or of his appearance
without service; and where each m'ay object
that the action was not commenced within the
time limited by the statute, its commencement
as to his objection is to be determined by the
time of service on him, and not by the time
of service on some other defendant. This is
a rule applicable to every action, and applies
as well to actions to enforce mechanics liens
as to any others. * * *"
Likewise in a Montana case, Marek v. Smith,
314 P2d 864, it was held:
"Where new parties are brought into a
case, and it appears between commencement
of the suit and time when they are brought in
the period of limitations had expired, the new
parties may plead the statute of limiations
as far as they themselves are concerned but
23
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the plea is not available to the original parties."
In a case under the Federal Rules decided in
Pennsylvania, Carlisle v. Monongahela Railway Co.,
16 F. R. D., 426 it was said,
"Neither operation of federal civil procedure rule as to joinder of parties nor amendment of complaint to assert direct cause of
action against third party defendant brought
in by original defendant instilled life into
plaintiff's action against such third party
defendant after expiration of limitation period, as such an amendment was in effect an
original complaint, filed too [ate against third
party defendant."
It seems likewise to be recognized as a general
rule that an intervention starts a new cause of action and the limitations run anew as to the parties
thus brought in and as between such parties and
the parties already in the action.
"However, it has been held that the statu'te of limitations ceases to run against the
dlaim of an intervener only from the date of
the intervention and not from the commencement of the suit, where there is no community
of interest and no privity of estate between
the intervener and the other parties * * *
Also, where a defendant makes no affirma'tive assertion of title to the property in the
suit until he has himself made a party plaintiff, the statute of limitations continues to run
against him until he is made plaintiff. * * *"
24
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54 C. J. S. Lirnitation of Actions P. 311, Sec.
276.
Also in the case of Kam [{oon Wan v. E. E.
Black, Ltd., decided in the district court of Hawaii,
75 F. Supp. 553, it is said at page 564,
"Under ordinary rules, since the filing
of a petition to intervene marks the introduction of a new party and a new cause of action, the situation is measured for the purposes of the statute of limitations as of the
date it was filed."
Respondent claims therefor the proteetion of
the Statutes of Limitation cited as against the claims
of the appellant, and since appellant has failed 'to
show himself either possessed of the property or
to have paid taxes thereon within the period of the
limitations provided by the sections cited, the bar
of the statute provides further grounds, if needed,
upon which to sustain the action of the lower court
in quieting the title to the tract in question in lhe
respondent.
CONCLUSION
The Court below correctly decided the issues
presented and granted the respondent the Summary
Judgment quieting title in the respondent to the
tract of land in question. The judgment of the lower
25
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court should be affirmed and the respondent
awarded his costs.
Respectfully submitted,
BOYDEN, TIBBALS, STATEN
& CROFT
By ALLEN H. TIBBALS
Attorneys for Intervening
Plaintiff and RespondentLeon Brown.

351 So. State Street, Suite #2
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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APPENDIX
78-12-5.1 UCA 1953 Seizure or possession within
seven years - Proviso - Tax title - No action for
the recovery of rea'l property or for the possession
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plain tiff or
his predecessor was seized or possessed of such property within seven years from the commencement
of such action; provided, however, that with respect
to actions or defenses brought or interposed for 'the
recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real property against the
holder of a tax title to such property, no such action
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more
than four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title unless
the person commencing or interposing such action
or defense or his predecessor has actually occupied
or been in posession of such property within four
years prior to the commencement or interposition of
such action or defense or within one year from the
effective date of this amendment.
7'8-12-5.2 Holder of tax title - Limitations of action or defense- Proviso- No action or defense
for the recovery or possession of rea'l property or to
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall
be commenced or interposed against the ho'lder of a
tax title after the expiration of four years from the
date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax
title to any county, or directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and
after the expiration of one year from the date of
this act. Provided, however, that this section shall
not bar any action or defense by the owner of the
legal title to such property where he or his predecessor has actual1y occupied or been in actual possession of such property within four years from
27
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the commencement or interposition of such action
or defense. And provided, further, that this section
shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an
action by the holder of a tax title, to the effect that
such city or town holds a lien against such property
which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder
of such tax title.
78-12-5.3 Definition of "tax title" (and "action"
- Separability) - The term "tax title" as used
in section 78-12-5.2 and section 59-10-65, and the
related amended sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 7812-12, means any title to rea!! property, whether
valid or not, which has been derived through or is
dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer
of such property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against
such property whereby the property is relieved from
a tax lien.
Definition of "Action".
The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and cross-complaints and all
civil actions wherein. affirmative relief is sought.
Invalidity in Part.
If any section or part of section of this act
shal!l be held invalid, it shall not invalidate the remaining portions of this act.
78-12-7.1. Adverse possession - Presumption Proviso - Tax title - In every action for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet
title 'to or determine the owner thereof the person
establishing a legal title to such property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within
the time required by law; and the occupation of
such property by any other person shall be deemed
to have been under and in subordination to the legal
28
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title, un'less it appears that such property has been
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for
seven years before the commencement of such action.
Provided, however, that if in any action any party
shall establish prima facie evidence that he is the
owner of any real property under a tax title held
by him and his predecessors for four years prior
to the commencement of such action and one year
after the effective date of this amendment he shall
be presumed to be the o\vner of such property by
adverse possession unless it appears that the owner
of the lega:l ti tie or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property under
such title or that such tax title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied
or assessed upon such property within such four
year period.
78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes Proviso - tax title - In no case shall adverse possession be established under the provisions of this
Code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and clairned for the period of seven years
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors
and grantors have paid al1l the taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according
to law. Provided, however, that payment by the
holder of a tax title to real property or his predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon
such real property after the delinquent tax sale
or transfer under which he claims for a period of
not less than four years and for not less than one
year after the effective date of this amendment,
shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
this section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to estab'lish adverse possession.
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